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Abstract
 The sixteenth-century English poet Edmund Spenser has long seemed full of 
contradictions. On one hand, Spenser is a poet of “twelue priuate morall vertues,” falling into 
the civic-humanist tradition advocated by his predecessor Sir Philip Sidney. On the other hand, 
Spenser’s A View of the State of Ireland advocates a brutal and bloody colonial policy in relation 
to the Irish, views that seem incompatible with a master of moral poetry. I suggest that we 
understand the apparent contradiction as a conflict between Spenser’s classicism and his apparent 
acceptance of modern political philosophy, initiated by Niccolò Machiavelli. According to Leo 
Strauss, Machiavelli was an “esoteric” writer, someone who did not openly proclaim his doctrines of 
realpolitik. Machiavelli’s method broke with classical political philosophy, which—like the classical 
literature championed by Sidney—often taught moral or imaginary ideals as a guide to action. I 
argue that Spenser read Machiavelli well, understanding those chapters of The Prince most closely 
pertaining to Spenser’s own colonial situation in Ireland, and wrote A View according to those 
views. Spenser’s personal experience as a colonial administrator led him (following Machiavelli) 
to break decisively with classical political philosophy, even while Spenser’s literary theory refused 
to diverge from Sidney. In other words, Spenser is ancient in his art and modern in his politics. 
Rather than being simply a poet of the “State” or of nascent English nationalism, Spenser actually 
understands and encompasses the contradictions and changes of his own historical moment.
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politics. In A View on the State of Ireland, Spenser seems to argue for a harsh—even 
brutal—colonial policy towards Ireland. The dialogue’s main speaker, Irenius, proposes 
a number of solutions: permanent garrisons, forced relocations, despoliation of land. 
That despoliation would lead to famine, leading in turn to wide-scale starvation and 
death and thereby “solving” the so-called Irish problem. The policy aids and abets 
the brutal use of executive power against indigenous peoples, whose purpose is the 
maintenance of colonial rule and the increase of wealth and power for the English nation. 
 Tracing Spenser’s intellectual history, as Andrew Hadfield notes, is a tricky 
business. Hadfield himself suggests that Spenser’s Irish policy shares some correspondences 
with Jean Bodin. Bodin “took issue with Machiavelli’s contention that a republic was the 
most lasting form of government, alleging that despotism was in fact more durable because 
subjects could be controlled more easily and were unable to resist as free men were” (10). 
Yet Hadfield is careful to say that he notes only a correspondence, not necessarily a direct 
connection. For my part, I believe that, while a comparison with Bodin may be fruitful, a 
comparison with Niccolò Machiavelli can be more fruitful still. For now let me suggest that 
Machiavelli—as the first truly modern political philosopher—is the theorist most aware 
of the possibilities and dangers of realpolitik. Besides Spenser’s own reference to Discourses 
on Livy at the end of A View, we know that Machiavelli was well-known during Spenser’s 
school years; Spenser’s friend Gabriel Harvey boasted “[y]ou can not stepp into a schollars 
studye but (ten to on) you shall litely finde open” a volume either by Bodin or Machiavelli 
(79). Spenser’s own familiarity seems assured.
But it seems impossible to reconcile the ideality of Spenser’s poetry and the dauntingly 
pragmatic approach of his politics. His poetry creates a knight of perfect virtue while 
Spenser’s political views effectively sneer at those virtues—for example, Elizabeth’s 
mercy—as mere obstacles for a puissant political practice. My argument is that this tension 
never becomes resolved within Spenser’s thought; not only that, this tension results in a 
continuous and living contradiction. By a “living” contradiction I mean that, rather than 
threatening the foundations of his views as a normal foundation contradiction might, this 
contradiction actually spares Spenser from falling into ineffective practice. The keystone of 
my argument is Xenophon—or, rather, Xenophon’s interpretation of Cyrus. Machiavelli, 
like Spenser and many others prior to the nineteenth century, also rated Xenophon 
higher than Plato. Yet Machiavelli realized (in a way that Spenser apparently did not3 ) 
that Xenophon’s Cyrus never actually existed. He was a literary figure romanticized and 
idealized by Xenophon. Machiavelli recognized that Cyrus acquired and kept his empire 
3 For a contrary view, see Christopher Nadon. He views the Cyropaedia as a “drama” rather than a political 
treatise or a work of history, and he approvingly cites Spenser and Sidney for recognizing this fact (24). In his 
view, their belief that Xenophon is a “poet” seemingly equates to Xenophon’s “dramatic” qualities. Yet Nadon’s 
own insightful analysis of Cyropaedia requires the most exhaustive close and critical reading of the text—the 
same sort of reading required by Plato’s “dramas.” For my part, I see Spenser’s and Sidney’s art as strictly within 
the civic-humanist tradition. Their categorization of Xenophon as a poet indicates certain elements of ideality 
and moral virtue excluded by Nadon’s (and Machiavelli’s) reading of Xenophon’s text. In other words, the art of 
Spenser and Sidney seems entirely antithetical the political philosophy and hermeneutics of Machiavelli, who 
would not approve of The Faerie Queene.
In “A Letter of the Authors,” annexed to the 1590 The Faerie Queene, Edmund Spenser makes an interesting remark concerning the nature of the ideal. In defending his 
poetic practice, he contrasts Xenophon with Plato. According to Spenser, Plato had, “in the 
exquisite depth of his judgmement, formed a Commune welth such as it should be,” whereas 
Xenophon—writing about the (allegedly) perfect ruler in the Cyropaedia—“fashioned a 
gouernement such as might best be” (15). What fascinates Spenser about Xenophon is 
how Xenophon portrays his ideal ruler in terms of human figures and examples rather than 
through a series of doctrines, precepts, or rules. To put the matter in another way, talking 
about the “twelue priuate morall vertues” (16) in treatise form might have certain uses, 
Spenser believes, but it lacks the pure value of demonstrating those virtues as incarnated by 
exemplary figures. The Faerie Queene constitutes Spenser’s own contemporary attempt to 
demonstrate virtue incarnated. No mere treatise, risking dullness and pedantry, should hope 
to convey the loveliness of virtue as powerfully as masterfully-wrought poetry.1 
What makes “A Letter of the Authors” remarkable, though, is not just that Spenser 
values Xenophon more highly than later centuries typically did.2  Rather, it is that Spenser 
explicitly likens his poetic King Arthur to Xenophon’s Cyrus the Great. Thus Spenser 
follows in the footsteps not only of Xenophon but also of Vergil with Aeneas, Ariosto 
with Orlando, and Tasso with Rinaldo and Godfredo, and Homer with Agamemnon and 
Ulysses. Poetry—as a genre—enjoys a higher spot on the pedestal than either philosophy or 
history. Philosophy, on Spenser’s view, is the genre of rules and abstractions, exemplified by 
Plato’s Republic, and the historical shackles of historiography prevents historiography from 
attaining the freedom and power that poetry acquires easily.
Yet, beneath Spenser’s advocacy of poetry, lies a problem. He claims that poetry—
the highest genre—concretely represents the virtues, but Spenser offered only silence 
on what poetry of his sort cannot do, that is, discourse well on the realm of practical 
1 Spenser’s debt to An Apology for Poetry and Sir Philip Sidney (to whom he dedicated The Shepheardes Calenders) 
is clear. Sidney had defended poetry by arguing that it combined the precepts of historians with the moral 
focus of philosophers—arguing, in effect, that poetry surpasses both history and moral philosophy. Especially 
in terms of teaching morality, Sidney greatly prefers poets. “For, indeed, if the question were whether it were 
better to have a particular act truly or falsely set down, there is no doubt which is to be chosen, no more than 
whether you had rather have Vespasian’s picture right as he was, or, at the painter’s pleasure, nothing resembling. 
But if the question be for your own use and learning, whether it be better to have it set down as it should be 
or as it was, then certainly is more doctrinable the feigned Cyrus in Xenophon than the true Cyrus in Justin” 
(337-8). Because Sidney conceives the Greek writer Xenophon as an exemplary teacher of virtue, he categorized 
Xenophon as the “most excellent poets that never versified” (333). Niccolò Machiavelli’s task was to shatter the 
respect of potential rulers for those feigned Cyruses which they learned from men like Sidney; my argument 
will be that Spenser accepted that shattering for his political writings in terms of his practical politics, but that 
he kept those politics strictly separate from his poetical writings. By implication, although I will not have time 
to explore the point in great depth, I suggest that even the fifth book of The Faerie Queene owes its theoretical 
allegiance to Sidney rather than to Machiavelli.
2 To take one example out of many, the translator of one of Xenophon’s Penguin editions says quite easily that 
those “ages and people who dislike moral earnestness will not find Xenophon attractive.” Moral earnestness is all 
that Xenophon has, apparently, since “[c]ertainly, he is not an original thinker or writer” (Waterfield 8). In such 
works as On Tyranny and Xenophon’s Socrates, however, the political philosopher Leo Strauss has done much to 
revive Xenophon’s modern reputation.
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Rebellion (1579-1583)—itself a protest against English interference in Munster Country—
and resettled those lands among wealthy English colonists. On the other hand, none of 
these biographical details necessarily link Spenser to the draconian views promulgated by 
Irenius. Spenser himself apparently understoods the horror of the famine Irenius advocates. 
One mere year of famine, for example, will—despite the richness of the land—bring the 
populace
to such wretchednesse, as that any stony heart would have rued the same. 
Out of every corner of the woods and glynnes they came creeping forth 
upon their hands, for their legges could not beare them; they looked like 
anatomies of death, they spake like ghosts crying out of their graves; they 
did eate the dead carrions, happy where they could finde them, yea, and 
one another soone after, insomuch as the very carcasses they spared not 
to scrape out of their graves; and, if they found a plot of water-cresses 
or shamrocks, there they flocked as to a feast for the time, yet not able 
long to continue therewithall; that in short space there were none almost 
left, and a most populous and plentifull countrey suddainely left voyde 
of man and beast; yet sure in all that warre, there perished not many by 
the sword, but all by the extremitie of famine, which they themselves had 
wrought. (Spenser 101-2)
The crux of the argument separating Spenser from Irenius seems to be an overwhelming 
doubt that someone with his humanist education and poetical genius could sincerely 
espouse such horrors. To induce wide scale famine such as Irenius proposes—and suddenly 
to absolve the English from responsibility by saying that the Irish “themselves had wrought” 
it—seems monstrous and beyond belief. Irenius, so the argument might run, is an unreliable 
narrator, along the lines of Sir Raphael Hythloday in Sir Thomas More’s Utopia.
That Hythloday does not equal More is clear, even beyond the fact that he seems to 
advocate positions that More himself argues against in different writings.5  Many of the 
names within Utopia are jokes set to distance the reader from its views. “Utopia” means both 
a “good place” and a “no place”—a place that exists nowhere. The first name of the main 
speaker harkens to the archangel Raphael while his last name means “peddler of nonsense.” 
And many of the names within Utopia call attention to their own fictiveness, as More 
himself obliquely points out. While maintaining a veneer of verisimilitude, More writes 
that, if he had indeed written a fiction, he 
would have managed it so that, even though I might have wanted to 
deceive the ignorant mob, I would at least have inserted some pointed 
5 Some examples include the ease with which the Utopians practiced divorce and euthanasia, as well as how 
they permitted female priests as well as male—all practices anathema to a devout Catholic like More. A further 
contradiction might be seen in Hythloday’s Epicurean argument concerning philosophy and politics, i.e., that 
it runs counter to true philosophy for a philosopher to engage in politics, even as an advisor. Advisors must lead 
by indirection and half-truths (because full truths cannot be uttered safely). Philosophers, however, should never 
say what is not true. More himself, of course, was an extremely active political figure, thus leading to doubt about 
the equivalence between More himself and Hythloday.
via frauds; he could never have acquired his empire simply through those virtues ascribed to 
him by Xenophon: justness, benevolence, cool rationality, and a keen ambition nonetheless 
free from cruelty, vengefulness, and avarice.4  Yet where Spenser’s poetry unproblematically 
accepts the “poetic” creation of Xenophon, Spenser’s political science accepts Machiavelli 
and a Machiavellian interpretation of Xenophon—views irreconcilable with the poetic 
view. Spenser’s own practical experience as a colonial administrator showed him the 
limitations of the Xenophonic ideal; that, along with his sense of nationalism, led him into 
a political modernity first articulated by Machiavelli, a man who shattered classical models 
of political philosophy and their “imaginary” Republics and Princedoms (Machiavelli 40), 
even while Spenser’s artistic practice—based on unshattered classical models—created a 
separate intellectual sphere for his idealistic inclinations. Edmund Spenser stands astride 
the dividing point between the ancient world and modernity—a divide of which he seems 
blithely unaware. Yet it is this fundamental divide that leads Spenser, almost instinctively, 
to shy away from applying the moral virtues of The Faerie Queene to A View on the State of 
Ireland.
The second section of this paper examines the potentially greatest challenge to my 
view of Spenser as embodying a living intellectual contradiction—namely, that A View is 
not a work by Spenser at all. The third section aims to place Spenser more squarely within 
Machiavellian thought—emphasizing the distinctiveness of Machiavelli’s views and ways 
of reading ancient authors like Xenophon. Additionally, many chapters of The Prince bear 
directly on Spenser’s situation in Ireland, and I will suggest that we have good reasons 
for identifying Irenius quite closely with Spenser himself. My fourth section is a brief 
conclusion in which I suggest that little fruit is born from praising or censuring Spenser 
for his political views or his apparent contradictions (although from a modern perspective 
they certainly deserve censure). Ultimately, I recommend scholars consider Spenser in a 
pre-modern manner as much as possible, since only in such a way can we grasp how keenly 
attuned Spenser was to his revolutionary historical moment.
Spenser And The Authorship Of A View
Some debate exists on how closely we can identify Spenser with the main speaker 
of A View of the State of Ireland, Irenius. On one hand, we know that Spenser himself 
benefitted significantly from Irish colonialism, gaining the estate of Kilcolman in Cork 
County in 1589, earning the status of “gentleman.” He served as secretary to Lord Arthur 
Grey, the Lord Deputy of Ireland, and therefore probably witnessed the massacre of a 
Spanish garrison at Smerwick in 1580. He seems to have been involved with the Munster 
plantation scheme, a plan that took confiscated lands arising from the Second Desmond 
4 In Chapter XVIII, Machiavelli says that a ruler should seem to be “the embodiment of mercy, good faith, 
integrity, humanity, and religion” (47). The appearance of those virtues are more important than their reality, 
however. We must “understand that a Prince, and most of all a new Prince, cannot observe all those rules of 
conduct in respect whereof men are accounted good, being often forced, in order to preserve his Princedom, to 
act in opposition to good faith, charity, humanity, and religion” (46). Nobility and honor are honored by their 
breach.
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benefitted significantly from Irish colonialism, gaining the estate of Kilcolman in Cork 
County in 1589, earning the status of “gentleman.” He served as secretary to Lord Arthur 
Grey, the Lord Deputy of Ireland, and therefore probably witnessed the massacre of a 
Spanish garrison at Smerwick in 1580. He seems to have been involved with the Munster 
plantation scheme, a plan that took confiscated lands arising from the Second Desmond 
4 In Chapter XVIII, Machiavelli says that a ruler should seem to be “the embodiment of mercy, good faith, 
integrity, humanity, and religion” (47). The appearance of those virtues are more important than their reality, 
however. We must “understand that a Prince, and most of all a new Prince, cannot observe all those rules of 
conduct in respect whereof men are accounted good, being often forced, in order to preserve his Princedom, to 
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of the apparently appalling realization that “Spenser the political scientist” does irreparable 
harm to “Spenser the moral-humanist poet.”
 In a post-deconstructionist age, I take it as axiomatic that all texts are inherently 
unstable, and that it is legitimately possible to read A View against the grain. In other words, 
texts are not unified wholes intended to portray one clear meaning (or a finite number of 
such meanings) to a passively responsive reader. Rather, texts carry within themselves the 
seeds of their own subversion, dependent only on the willingness of some daring critic 
to point them out. Even if we do not grant A View the same sort of irony recognized for 
Utopia or even a text like Erasmus’s In Praise of Folly, someone might legitimately argue 
that ambiguity lies at the core of A View. Ciaran Brady, claiming that A View was originally 
written as a prose tract on politics, argues that Spenser eventually switched to the dialogue 
form because he wanted to place his brutal policies within the humanist tradition—worried 
that, if he simply stated his views bluntly in treatise form, the English may otherwise 
become “brutalized by the task which they were being urged to undertake in Ireland” (47). 
This Spenser may be more palatable to some, insofar as it seems to explain why Spenser may 
have felt no contradiction between his roles as poet and politician, but hardly constitutes a 
defense of Spenser, especially under a postcolonial viewpoint. Reconciling the poet with the 
colonial administrator does not, in the end, absolve the colonial administrator. 6
The question then becomes: how likely is it that Spenser’s political tract would subvert 
its own surface meaning? To this question I would like to make two comments. My first 
point involves what political philosopher Leo Strauss calls “esoteric writing.” Users of 
this art incorporate both an exoteric and an esoteric teaching into their texts. The exoteric 
teaching is meant for cursory readings of texts; the content seems relatively culturally and 
politically acceptable. The esoteric teaching, however, contains more heterodox opinions—
the sorts of opinions that might question the foundations of what the society considers 
to be sacred and unanimous, or, less dramatically, question opinions held to be salutatory 
to society in general (such as belief in a god who upholds the moral order). Those who 
hold heterodox views must provisionally accept orthodox opinion before guiding readers 
with a philosophical disposition into replacing the orthodox opinion with heterodox (and 
philosophical) knowledge. Thus (discussing the Muslim philosopher Fārābī), Strauss says 
that it is “rash to identify the teaching of the falāsifa with what they taught most frequently 
or most conspicuously” (17). These careful writers must be take the fate of Socrates as their 
6 Wesley Kisting also attempts to mitigate some of the sting of Spenser’s imperialism. He argues that critics 
such as Ciaran Brady and Nicholas Canny improperly ignore A View’s dialogue form, seeing it as a “monovocal” 
text; under their view, Spenser equals Irenius and Eudoxus constitutes the straw man. Nonetheless, even Kisting 
can only achieve so much by arguing that “equivocal language infuses” Spenser’s two most relevant works, A 
View and Book V of the Faerie Queene, which allegedly results in a “moral ambivalence” equally present in both 
works (29). That is to say, Kisting claims that Spenser simultaneously acknowledges Irenius’s violent strategy 
and sees “mercy as a dire threat to justice as well as a serious failure of the reader’s moral responsibility to rescue 
Ireland from damnable savagery” (32). Even if we accept the claim that the logic behind A View is ultimately 
“self-subverting” (29), Spenser’s concrete position as an advocate of bloody-minded English imperialism does 
not save him from the ultimate charge, one also leveled by Chinua Achebe against Joseph Conrad—that he is a 
“a thoroughgoing racist” (1789).
hints which would have let the more learned discover what I was about. 
Thus even if I had done nothing more than assign to the ruler, river, city 
and island such names as would have informed learned readers that the 
island is nowhere, the city is a phantom, the river has no water, the ruler 
no people, which would not have been hard to do and would have been 
much more elegant than what I actually did, for if I had not been forced 
by historical accuracy, I am not so stupid as to use those barbarous and 
meaningless names Utopia, Anyder, Amaurot, and Ademus. (139)
The joke, of course, is that More does precisely what he disavows doing. A View contains 
no such pointed hints, however. The dialogue operates on a quite surface level. Eudoxus 
(whose name means “good belief ”) listens to—and gradually becomes persuaded by—his 
friend Irenius. Throughout the first half of the dialogue, Eudoxus’s literary existence enables 
Irenius conveniently to discourse on the laws, customs, and religion of the Irish natives. In 
the second half of the dialogue, Eudoxus serves as the voice of natural sentiment and mercy. 
He protests Irenius’s increasingly violent “solutions” to the Irish problem before, finally, 
succumbing to the inexorable pressure of Irenius’s “logic.”
 The primary motivation for reading A View against the grain, it seems to me, is 
the desire to “salvage” Spenser as a poet. Yeats, for one, had readily distinguished between 
Spenser the poet and Spenser the colonial administrator, lamenting that Spenser the man 
had been so unfortunately subservient to “the State,” someone who wrote “out of thoughts 
and emotions that had been organized by the State” and saw nothing “but what he was 
desired to see” (372), blinding the poet in him to the native genius of the Irish whom he 
should have admired. Nonetheless, as Ciaran Brady accurately notes, we cannot so easily 
gloss over the fact that Spenser’s apparent “ethical defense of brutality” calls into question 
Spenser’s entire “moral sensibility” (18)—a stunning denouement for a poet whose great 
theme is the “twelue priuate morall vertues.” Stephen Greenblatt’s conclusion might seem 
doubly outrageous, suggesting as he does that Edmund Spenser saw the destruction of Irish 
culture (seen as the barbarous Other) as vital to maintaining English identity and therefore 
English colonial power. Greenblatt concludes, “Spenser’s art does not lead us to perceive 
ideology critically, but rather affirms the existence and inescapable moral power of ideology 
as that principle of truth toward which art forever yearns” (192). For some, it is difficult to 
accept that Spenser’s art—seen as a paragon of humanistic learning and virtue—connotes 
the “inescapable moral power of ideology,” which would effectively undermine the entire 
Renaissance humanist project of virtuous citizenship and active participation in civic life. 
The desire to exculpate Spenser can go to amazing lengths. Jean Brink argues, for example, 
that “the grounds for attributing the View to Spenser are highly circumstantial” (221)—the 
logic being that Spenser cannot be held accountable for views that do not belong to him. 
While her argument rests mainly on the fact that no scholar has yet done significant textual 
analysis on A View’s numerous extant manuscripts, Brink at best only raises a few questions 
against the long-held view of Spenser’s authorship. Yet such questions are only raised out 
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to point them out. Even if we do not grant A View the same sort of irony recognized for 
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The question then becomes: how likely is it that Spenser’s political tract would subvert 
its own surface meaning? To this question I would like to make two comments. My first 
point involves what political philosopher Leo Strauss calls “esoteric writing.” Users of 
this art incorporate both an exoteric and an esoteric teaching into their texts. The exoteric 
teaching is meant for cursory readings of texts; the content seems relatively culturally and 
politically acceptable. The esoteric teaching, however, contains more heterodox opinions—
the sorts of opinions that might question the foundations of what the society considers 
to be sacred and unanimous, or, less dramatically, question opinions held to be salutatory 
to society in general (such as belief in a god who upholds the moral order). Those who 
hold heterodox views must provisionally accept orthodox opinion before guiding readers 
with a philosophical disposition into replacing the orthodox opinion with heterodox (and 
philosophical) knowledge. Thus (discussing the Muslim philosopher Fārābī), Strauss says 
that it is “rash to identify the teaching of the falāsifa with what they taught most frequently 
or most conspicuously” (17). These careful writers must be take the fate of Socrates as their 
6 Wesley Kisting also attempts to mitigate some of the sting of Spenser’s imperialism. He argues that critics 
such as Ciaran Brady and Nicholas Canny improperly ignore A View’s dialogue form, seeing it as a “monovocal” 
text; under their view, Spenser equals Irenius and Eudoxus constitutes the straw man. Nonetheless, even Kisting 
can only achieve so much by arguing that “equivocal language infuses” Spenser’s two most relevant works, A 
View and Book V of the Faerie Queene, which allegedly results in a “moral ambivalence” equally present in both 
works (29). That is to say, Kisting claims that Spenser simultaneously acknowledges Irenius’s violent strategy 
and sees “mercy as a dire threat to justice as well as a serious failure of the reader’s moral responsibility to rescue 
Ireland from damnable savagery” (32). Even if we accept the claim that the logic behind A View is ultimately 
“self-subverting” (29), Spenser’s concrete position as an advocate of bloody-minded English imperialism does 
not save him from the ultimate charge, one also leveled by Chinua Achebe against Joseph Conrad—that he is a 
“a thoroughgoing racist” (1789).
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(whose name means “good belief ”) listens to—and gradually becomes persuaded by—his 
friend Irenius. Throughout the first half of the dialogue, Eudoxus’s literary existence enables 
Irenius conveniently to discourse on the laws, customs, and religion of the Irish natives. In 
the second half of the dialogue, Eudoxus serves as the voice of natural sentiment and mercy. 
He protests Irenius’s increasingly violent “solutions” to the Irish problem before, finally, 
succumbing to the inexorable pressure of Irenius’s “logic.”
 The primary motivation for reading A View against the grain, it seems to me, is 
the desire to “salvage” Spenser as a poet. Yeats, for one, had readily distinguished between 
Spenser the poet and Spenser the colonial administrator, lamenting that Spenser the man 
had been so unfortunately subservient to “the State,” someone who wrote “out of thoughts 
and emotions that had been organized by the State” and saw nothing “but what he was 
desired to see” (372), blinding the poet in him to the native genius of the Irish whom he 
should have admired. Nonetheless, as Ciaran Brady accurately notes, we cannot so easily 
gloss over the fact that Spenser’s apparent “ethical defense of brutality” calls into question 
Spenser’s entire “moral sensibility” (18)—a stunning denouement for a poet whose great 
theme is the “twelue priuate morall vertues.” Stephen Greenblatt’s conclusion might seem 
doubly outrageous, suggesting as he does that Edmund Spenser saw the destruction of Irish 
culture (seen as the barbarous Other) as vital to maintaining English identity and therefore 
English colonial power. Greenblatt concludes, “Spenser’s art does not lead us to perceive 
ideology critically, but rather affirms the existence and inescapable moral power of ideology 
as that principle of truth toward which art forever yearns” (192). For some, it is difficult to 
accept that Spenser’s art—seen as a paragon of humanistic learning and virtue—connotes 
the “inescapable moral power of ideology,” which would effectively undermine the entire 
Renaissance humanist project of virtuous citizenship and active participation in civic life. 
The desire to exculpate Spenser can go to amazing lengths. Jean Brink argues, for example, 
that “the grounds for attributing the View to Spenser are highly circumstantial” (221)—the 
logic being that Spenser cannot be held accountable for views that do not belong to him. 
While her argument rests mainly on the fact that no scholar has yet done significant textual 
analysis on A View’s numerous extant manuscripts, Brink at best only raises a few questions 
against the long-held view of Spenser’s authorship. Yet such questions are only raised out 
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of recorded history. And the brutality Spenser advocated in regard to Ireland had wide 
precedent. 
 The pity and pathos of the fall of Troy, for example, would today have served as 
the rallying cry for anti-colonialism, but the Greek world, while recognizing the tragedy 
of the event, nevertheless engaged in warfare and conquest. Calls for “mercy” often went 
unheeded. Euripides’s play Trojan Women objected to the Athenian actions to the island 
of Delos during the Peloponnesian war. Delos was a neutral city-state, small in size, but 
the Athenians wished to conquer it in order to intimidate the Spartans. The city-state 
was conquered, eventually; its men killed, its women and children enslaved—the standard 
Greek practice for cities defeated in war. Early during the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides 
relates a story of how the Athenian Assembly decided to put a rebellious polis in its empire 
to the sword, sent off a small force to do so—and repented of its decision two days later. 
Fortunately, their message reached the navy in time to forestall a slaughter, but on such 
slender threads did ancient imperial policy hang. Rome was even harsher. Julius Caesar 
nearly depopulated Gaul in his subjugation of that province, and Carthage was leveled 
to the ground and its fields sown with salt so that nothing might grow there again. As 
for the forced relocation Spenser advocated, these too have their historical precedents—
most famously with the Babylonian captivity of the Jews. What is important is not that 
the Elizabethans might find Spenser’s views shocking (many certainly did—otherwise 
Eudoxus would not have been necessary), but that such shock or horror cannot be seen in 
the same way as in a world that has witnessed both the Holocaust and de-colonization.
Indeed, Catherine G. Canino makes the argument—which fits nicely with my own 
general point—that the massacre of the Spanish garrison at Smerwick would not have 
earned Lord Grey the censure accorded him by Irenius in A View. In other words Irenius, 
in defending Lord Grey’s actions, is actually the source of the Lord Grey’s reputation as a 
“bloody” man. According to state papers and personal correspondence during the period, 
Grey was never censured, whether in Ireland, England, or the continent. Elizabeth’s well-
known letter to Grey mentioning his “happy success against the invaders” and “wishing 
[only] that those who have been spared had been reserved for her to have extended either 
justice or mercy” is more congratulations than condemnation—despite being frequently 
cited as indicating condemnation (qtd. in Canino 7). Canino notes that foreign reaction 
to Smerwick also seems muted. Overall, while Grey was criticized and maligned by many, 
which eventually led to his recall,
this criticism was not, as the View states, because of his representation 
as a ‘bloody’ man. The state papers clearly demonstrate that Grey was 
under suspicion of mishandling or overspending state funds; his recall, 
and virtually all of Elizabeth’s decisions about Ireland, were not caused so 
much by moral outrage as by simple economics. (Canino 8)
Unfortunately, Canino cites this as evidence supporting Jean Brink’s view questioning the 
authorship of A View. To be fair, although Canino herself think Spenser’s authorship of A 
View unlikely, she also offers two potential alternative explanations: either Spenser might 
guiding principle, a man accused for introducing new gods into the city and for thereby 
corrupting the young. The questioning stance implied by all philosophy poses dangers to 
political societies and political regimes, who need a fundamental agreement (without serious 
argument) about “sacred” things in order to maintain social and political stability. Esoteric 
writers, wishing to philosophize while avoiding persecution, therefore place contradictions, 
ambiguities, instabilities within their texts that undermine the exoteric interpretation (36). 
Such clues guide the careful reader towards the hidden—but personally dangerous—real 
teaching of the text.
Unfortunately, notwithstanding the (anti-deconstructive) thesis that texts may contain 
secret-but-true meanings, Spenser’s View does not qualify for esoteric reading. This art 
is meant to protect the holder of heterodox opinions from persecution. In such texts, a 
bland meaning masks more subversive or dangerous meanings. A View, however, operates in 
precisely the opposite way—the shocking opinion is stated outright, seemingly convincing 
the rational Eudoxus. If “mercy” toward the colonized were the text’s actual purposes, there 
seems to be no reason for hiding it—especially as Irenius explicitly links that mercy to 
Queen Elizabeth. Although anti-Irish sentiment was rampant at the time, it did not exist 
to the extent that advocates of mercy would have been persecuted.
Indeed, framing an argument for a “merciful” policy toward Ireland might have found 
a number of palatable forms for a Christian humanist audience. One such argument could 
simply be a worry about saving souls—acquiring and maintaining an empire, bloody process 
that it is, does not lead to the sort of spiritual purity conducive to entering Heaven. (Such 
an argument puts a religious slant on Spenser’s worry—according to Ciaran Brady’s—
about the effect imperial brutality would have on the English subjects who carried them 
out.) Another argument might rest upon classical foundations. Many ancient political 
theorists held that a good state (such as Athens or Sparta) must be small in order to be 
successful. The far-flung Persian empire was the ultimate symbol of luxury and decadence, 
and it would not have been lost on Spenser that the precipitous decline of Sparta as a 
Greek power began almost as soon as its victory in the Peloponnesian war granted it 
Athens’s empire. Additionally, many conservative Romans of the later Republic blamed the 
perceived decline of Roman virtue on the wealth acquired from newly conquered Carthage 
and Greece. Such views were readily available to the classically trained Spenser. He might 
well have employed such arguments—but chose not to.
Writing at a time before any value was placed on multiculturalism, universal rights, or 
the autonomy of indigenous peoples, “diversity” within a state was not a sign of its progress 
but a potential cause of its decay. Even the religious “tolerance” of John Locke—a noted 
liberal thinker—two centuries later did not include atheists or Muslims under the umbrella 
of that tolerance. The anachronistic desire to judge Spenser according to multiculturalist or 
postcolonial values leads to my second observation. This one also derives from the classics—
namely, the examples set by antiquity. Colonialism was not something stumbled upon with 
Ireland or the discovery of the New World—it has existed literally through the entirety 
Classical Poetry and Modern Political Philosophy: Spenser and Machiavelli in A View of the State of Ireland
Middle Tennessee State University 98 Spring 2014
Scientia et Humanitas: A Journal of Student Research
of recorded history. And the brutality Spenser advocated in regard to Ireland had wide 
precedent. 
 The pity and pathos of the fall of Troy, for example, would today have served as 
the rallying cry for anti-colonialism, but the Greek world, while recognizing the tragedy 
of the event, nevertheless engaged in warfare and conquest. Calls for “mercy” often went 
unheeded. Euripides’s play Trojan Women objected to the Athenian actions to the island 
of Delos during the Peloponnesian war. Delos was a neutral city-state, small in size, but 
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for the forced relocation Spenser advocated, these too have their historical precedents—
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Eudoxus would not have been necessary), but that such shock or horror cannot be seen in 
the same way as in a world that has witnessed both the Holocaust and de-colonization.
Indeed, Catherine G. Canino makes the argument—which fits nicely with my own 
general point—that the massacre of the Spanish garrison at Smerwick would not have 
earned Lord Grey the censure accorded him by Irenius in A View. In other words Irenius, 
in defending Lord Grey’s actions, is actually the source of the Lord Grey’s reputation as a 
“bloody” man. According to state papers and personal correspondence during the period, 
Grey was never censured, whether in Ireland, England, or the continent. Elizabeth’s well-
known letter to Grey mentioning his “happy success against the invaders” and “wishing 
[only] that those who have been spared had been reserved for her to have extended either 
justice or mercy” is more congratulations than condemnation—despite being frequently 
cited as indicating condemnation (qtd. in Canino 7). Canino notes that foreign reaction 
to Smerwick also seems muted. Overall, while Grey was criticized and maligned by many, 
which eventually led to his recall,
this criticism was not, as the View states, because of his representation 
as a ‘bloody’ man. The state papers clearly demonstrate that Grey was 
under suspicion of mishandling or overspending state funds; his recall, 
and virtually all of Elizabeth’s decisions about Ireland, were not caused so 
much by moral outrage as by simple economics. (Canino 8)
Unfortunately, Canino cites this as evidence supporting Jean Brink’s view questioning the 
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View unlikely, she also offers two potential alternative explanations: either Spenser might 
guiding principle, a man accused for introducing new gods into the city and for thereby 
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political societies and political regimes, who need a fundamental agreement (without serious 
argument) about “sacred” things in order to maintain social and political stability. Esoteric 
writers, wishing to philosophize while avoiding persecution, therefore place contradictions, 
ambiguities, instabilities within their texts that undermine the exoteric interpretation (36). 
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Unfortunately, notwithstanding the (anti-deconstructive) thesis that texts may contain 
secret-but-true meanings, Spenser’s View does not qualify for esoteric reading. This art 
is meant to protect the holder of heterodox opinions from persecution. In such texts, a 
bland meaning masks more subversive or dangerous meanings. A View, however, operates in 
precisely the opposite way—the shocking opinion is stated outright, seemingly convincing 
the rational Eudoxus. If “mercy” toward the colonized were the text’s actual purposes, there 
seems to be no reason for hiding it—especially as Irenius explicitly links that mercy to 
Queen Elizabeth. Although anti-Irish sentiment was rampant at the time, it did not exist 
to the extent that advocates of mercy would have been persecuted.
Indeed, framing an argument for a “merciful” policy toward Ireland might have found 
a number of palatable forms for a Christian humanist audience. One such argument could 
simply be a worry about saving souls—acquiring and maintaining an empire, bloody process 
that it is, does not lead to the sort of spiritual purity conducive to entering Heaven. (Such 
an argument puts a religious slant on Spenser’s worry—according to Ciaran Brady’s—
about the effect imperial brutality would have on the English subjects who carried them 
out.) Another argument might rest upon classical foundations. Many ancient political 
theorists held that a good state (such as Athens or Sparta) must be small in order to be 
successful. The far-flung Persian empire was the ultimate symbol of luxury and decadence, 
and it would not have been lost on Spenser that the precipitous decline of Sparta as a 
Greek power began almost as soon as its victory in the Peloponnesian war granted it 
Athens’s empire. Additionally, many conservative Romans of the later Republic blamed the 
perceived decline of Roman virtue on the wealth acquired from newly conquered Carthage 
and Greece. Such views were readily available to the classically trained Spenser. He might 
well have employed such arguments—but chose not to.
Writing at a time before any value was placed on multiculturalism, universal rights, or 
the autonomy of indigenous peoples, “diversity” within a state was not a sign of its progress 
but a potential cause of its decay. Even the religious “tolerance” of John Locke—a noted 
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of that tolerance. The anachronistic desire to judge Spenser according to multiculturalist or 
postcolonial values leads to my second observation. This one also derives from the classics—
namely, the examples set by antiquity. Colonialism was not something stumbled upon with 
Ireland or the discovery of the New World—it has existed literally through the entirety 
Classical Poetry and Modern Political Philosophy: Spenser and Machiavelli in A View of the State of Ireland
Middle Tennessee State University 1110 Spring 2014
Scientia et Humanitas: A Journal of Student Research
what he could not control. Under my interpretation, what Machiavelli really intends here 
is to show how princes can always subjugate new kingdoms that differ from the original 
kingdom in matters of language, usages, and laws.
The easiest way to pacify a mixed princedom, continues Machiavelli, is for the prince 
to dwell there himself. He gives the example of the Turks. Dwelling in a province tends to 
solve problems before they arise; it also ensures that the province “is not pillaged by [the 
prince’s] officers” (4). Such a relocation would not have been palatable for Elizabeth of 
course, though colonization might have succeeded better if she had. According to Nicholas 
Canny in Making Ireland British, a key reason England never succeeded in making Ireland 
“British” was the greed of low-level British officials called “servitors” who, in their rapacity 
for new “plantation” lands, basically sabotaged attempts to assimilate the Irish. Ardently 
Protestant in their sympathies, these servitors—using Spenser’s political tract as a rallying 
cry—permanently alienated the native Catholic Irish.
Otherwise, if princes will not abide in the new kingdom, they might also establish 
colonies, a proposal strongly championed by Irenius. 8 A problem emerges even here, 
however. As Machiavelli says, the only people harmed by colonies are the displaced natives. 
Those “who are thus injured form but a small part of the community, and remaining 
scattered and poor can never become dangerous” (4). As Irenius points out, however, 
dispossessed Irish can become problematic, since the bogs and marshes can provide shelter 
for potential rebels, and even their attire—such as the Gaelic mantle—can prove dangerous 
to the colonizer because of its immense utility. Irenius, in his practical experience of Ireland, 
knows that the dispossessed can be a significant problem. 
Yet here we have encountered a faux statement by Machiavelli, a case of misdirection. 
Famously, Machiavelli later states that “men will sooner forget the death of their father than 
the loss of their patrimony” (44)—basically asserting the primacy of wealth over kinship, 
meaning that confiscating the lands of natives is the most potent means of radicalizing them 
against a new prince. Yet Machiavelli contradicts the “colonies are safe options” principle 
even within the same chapter. When Machiavelli discusses King Louis IX’s failure in Italy, 
for example, he lists five blunders committed by that king, such as aggrandizing another 
foreign power (Pope Alexander VI), dividing his new princedom with yet another power 
(Spain), and so forth. No sooner does Machiavelli recount these errors, however, then he 
dismisses them. “[A]ll these blunders might not have proved disastrous to him while he 
lived, had he not added to them a sixth in depriving the Venetians of their dominions” (7). 
So while colonies can successfully aid in the subjugation of a new princedom, dispossessed 
natives like the Venetians or the Irish are a problem—perhaps the most important problem.
Having brought attention to this problem, however, Machiavelli once again grows coy. 
The natural maneuver at this point would be to explain how Louis might have successfully 
deprived the Venetians of their dominions. Machiavelli instead changes the topic; he 
8 Machiavelli also disparages garrisons as too costly, but Irenius seems to have understood that objection when 
he, several times, answers Eudoxus’s concerns about cost by saying that the garrisons should live off the rent of 
the land they occupy.
have misremembered or misreported the man he had once served as secretary, or he might 
have been attempting to damn Grey under the veneer of praising him. We might choose 
a fourth option, though. It may be that A View is not concerned with accurately reporting 
on Lord Grey; modern positivistic or scientific historiography would be anachronistic 
during Spenser’s time. Rather, Irenius’s Lord Grey could be a primarily literary character, 
or someone appropriated by Spenser for literary purposes, in order to highlight what I 
consider to be the special significance of A View—the tension of art as conceived under 
classical models and of political philosophy as conceived by the first modern political 
philosopher: Niccolo Machiavelli.
Machiavelli and Xenophon; or, Machiavelli’s reading of Scipio reading Xenophon
A key section of The Prince might be the third chapter, “Of Mixed Princedoms” (by 
which Machiavelli means adding newly conquered lands to the inherited kingdom). It 
seems to pertain most directly to the English situation in Ireland. The previous chapter 
had been “Of Hereditary Princedoms,” a vastly shorter chapter indicative of Machiavelli’s 
relative disinterest in that topic. According to Machiavelli, hereditary princedoms are easy 
to maintain, because “the very antiquity and continuance of [the prince’s] rule will efface 
the memories and causes which lead to innovation” (2)—meaning that people are likely 
to have forgotten the various acts of evil that must be done in order to subjugate a new 
province. Machiavelli might also have said that, in such princedoms, it is easier for a prince 
to practice those virtues as praised by the poets and the philosophers and as incarnated by 
Marcus Aurelius—ruler of the hereditary kingdom par excellence, Rome during the Pax 
Romana.
Yet mixed princedoms abound in difficulties. Not only will the people one has harmed 
become enemies, but so potentially will the people one has helped—if such allies could 
once open their gates to a foreign conqueror, they might do so again. A greater difficulty, 
Machiavelli notes, is when the acquired kingdom differs from the imperial kingdom in 
matters of language, usages, and laws—differences that Irenius amply demonstrates 
in A View after allegedly proving their “barbaric” Scythian origins. In such a situation, 
says Machiavelli, a “great good fortune, as well as address, is needed to overcome” these 
obstacles (3). And it is important to note that while “great good fortune” and “address” 
are necessary7—implying a distinction between a controlling Fate outside the self and the 
prince’s own personal virtù—elsewhere in The Prince Machiavelli seems to collapse two 
terms into one—that is, virtù simply, without any exterior guiding fate. One of Machiavelli’s 
most famous sayings is the maxim that “Fortune is a woman who to be kept under must be 
beaten and roughly handled; and we see that she suffers herself to be more readily mastered 
by those who so treat her than by those who are more timid in their approaches” (68). Yet 
this saying comes only at the end of The Prince, long after demonstrating the character and 
necessity of virtù. So Machiavelli’s initial distinction between fortuna and virtù is only a 
façade, a sop to ancient political thought that held man to be partially helpless against 
7 By “address” Machiavelli means how a prince handles or addresses a situation.
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what he could not control. Under my interpretation, what Machiavelli really intends here 
is to show how princes can always subjugate new kingdoms that differ from the original 
kingdom in matters of language, usages, and laws.
The easiest way to pacify a mixed princedom, continues Machiavelli, is for the prince 
to dwell there himself. He gives the example of the Turks. Dwelling in a province tends to 
solve problems before they arise; it also ensures that the province “is not pillaged by [the 
prince’s] officers” (4). Such a relocation would not have been palatable for Elizabeth of 
course, though colonization might have succeeded better if she had. According to Nicholas 
Canny in Making Ireland British, a key reason England never succeeded in making Ireland 
“British” was the greed of low-level British officials called “servitors” who, in their rapacity 
for new “plantation” lands, basically sabotaged attempts to assimilate the Irish. Ardently 
Protestant in their sympathies, these servitors—using Spenser’s political tract as a rallying 
cry—permanently alienated the native Catholic Irish.
Otherwise, if princes will not abide in the new kingdom, they might also establish 
colonies, a proposal strongly championed by Irenius. 8 A problem emerges even here, 
however. As Machiavelli says, the only people harmed by colonies are the displaced natives. 
Those “who are thus injured form but a small part of the community, and remaining 
scattered and poor can never become dangerous” (4). As Irenius points out, however, 
dispossessed Irish can become problematic, since the bogs and marshes can provide shelter 
for potential rebels, and even their attire—such as the Gaelic mantle—can prove dangerous 
to the colonizer because of its immense utility. Irenius, in his practical experience of Ireland, 
knows that the dispossessed can be a significant problem. 
Yet here we have encountered a faux statement by Machiavelli, a case of misdirection. 
Famously, Machiavelli later states that “men will sooner forget the death of their father than 
the loss of their patrimony” (44)—basically asserting the primacy of wealth over kinship, 
meaning that confiscating the lands of natives is the most potent means of radicalizing them 
against a new prince. Yet Machiavelli contradicts the “colonies are safe options” principle 
even within the same chapter. When Machiavelli discusses King Louis IX’s failure in Italy, 
for example, he lists five blunders committed by that king, such as aggrandizing another 
foreign power (Pope Alexander VI), dividing his new princedom with yet another power 
(Spain), and so forth. No sooner does Machiavelli recount these errors, however, then he 
dismisses them. “[A]ll these blunders might not have proved disastrous to him while he 
lived, had he not added to them a sixth in depriving the Venetians of their dominions” (7). 
So while colonies can successfully aid in the subjugation of a new princedom, dispossessed 
natives like the Venetians or the Irish are a problem—perhaps the most important problem.
Having brought attention to this problem, however, Machiavelli once again grows coy. 
The natural maneuver at this point would be to explain how Louis might have successfully 
deprived the Venetians of their dominions. Machiavelli instead changes the topic; he 
8 Machiavelli also disparages garrisons as too costly, but Irenius seems to have understood that objection when 
he, several times, answers Eudoxus’s concerns about cost by saying that the garrisons should live off the rent of 
the land they occupy.
have misremembered or misreported the man he had once served as secretary, or he might 
have been attempting to damn Grey under the veneer of praising him. We might choose 
a fourth option, though. It may be that A View is not concerned with accurately reporting 
on Lord Grey; modern positivistic or scientific historiography would be anachronistic 
during Spenser’s time. Rather, Irenius’s Lord Grey could be a primarily literary character, 
or someone appropriated by Spenser for literary purposes, in order to highlight what I 
consider to be the special significance of A View—the tension of art as conceived under 
classical models and of political philosophy as conceived by the first modern political 
philosopher: Niccolo Machiavelli.
Machiavelli and Xenophon; or, Machiavelli’s reading of Scipio reading Xenophon
A key section of The Prince might be the third chapter, “Of Mixed Princedoms” (by 
which Machiavelli means adding newly conquered lands to the inherited kingdom). It 
seems to pertain most directly to the English situation in Ireland. The previous chapter 
had been “Of Hereditary Princedoms,” a vastly shorter chapter indicative of Machiavelli’s 
relative disinterest in that topic. According to Machiavelli, hereditary princedoms are easy 
to maintain, because “the very antiquity and continuance of [the prince’s] rule will efface 
the memories and causes which lead to innovation” (2)—meaning that people are likely 
to have forgotten the various acts of evil that must be done in order to subjugate a new 
province. Machiavelli might also have said that, in such princedoms, it is easier for a prince 
to practice those virtues as praised by the poets and the philosophers and as incarnated by 
Marcus Aurelius—ruler of the hereditary kingdom par excellence, Rome during the Pax 
Romana.
Yet mixed princedoms abound in difficulties. Not only will the people one has harmed 
become enemies, but so potentially will the people one has helped—if such allies could 
once open their gates to a foreign conqueror, they might do so again. A greater difficulty, 
Machiavelli notes, is when the acquired kingdom differs from the imperial kingdom in 
matters of language, usages, and laws—differences that Irenius amply demonstrates 
in A View after allegedly proving their “barbaric” Scythian origins. In such a situation, 
says Machiavelli, a “great good fortune, as well as address, is needed to overcome” these 
obstacles (3). And it is important to note that while “great good fortune” and “address” 
are necessary7—implying a distinction between a controlling Fate outside the self and the 
prince’s own personal virtù—elsewhere in The Prince Machiavelli seems to collapse two 
terms into one—that is, virtù simply, without any exterior guiding fate. One of Machiavelli’s 
most famous sayings is the maxim that “Fortune is a woman who to be kept under must be 
beaten and roughly handled; and we see that she suffers herself to be more readily mastered 
by those who so treat her than by those who are more timid in their approaches” (68). Yet 
this saying comes only at the end of The Prince, long after demonstrating the character and 
necessity of virtù. So Machiavelli’s initial distinction between fortuna and virtù is only a 
façade, a sop to ancient political thought that held man to be partially helpless against 
7 By “address” Machiavelli means how a prince handles or addresses a situation.
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mixture of admiration for Cyrus and reservations about him makes Xenophon unwilling to 
depict Cyrus either as an out-and-out tyrant or as morally flawless” (126). 9
Although Machiavelli approves of Xenophon’s approbation of ambition, he must also 
distinguish between a textual Cyrus and a real Cyrus—viz., the actual prince versus the 
literary prince created by Xenophon. Whereas Achilles, Alexander, and Caesar had all 
imitated forebears, Scipio along had imitated not a forebear but the textual Cyrus:
And whoever reads the life of Cyrus, written by Xenophon, will recognize 
afterwards in the life of Scipio how that imitation was his glory, and how in 
chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality Scipio conformed to those things 
which have been written of Cyrus by Xenophon. (Machiavelli 66)
And it was commonly accepted that Scipio did greatly admire Xenophon. Cicero described 
the education of Cyrus as a “model of the just empire” and the constant guide of Scipio 
(Newell 110). But the problem is that those qualities described by Xenophon are not 
the sorts of qualities that enable one to acquire new princedoms, as Machiavelli well 
understood. Scipio’s career in the province of Spain was not successful until he adopted 
more “brutal” practices. We see such disjunction between political literature and political 
reality repeatedly in Machiavelli. Marcus Aurelius succeeded only because he inherited 
his kingdom; King Louis IX lost his kingdoms in Italy because he “kept faith” with the 
foreign powers he invited to share power there. And, as Spenser’s Irenius no doubt realizes, 
having deprived native Irish of their estates in order to plant English colonies, the noblest 
virtues of a prince—chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality—cannot be practiced safely. 
Unlike the English themselves—a people, once conquered by the Romans, who have 
forgotten the concrete measures taken by the Romans to subjugate them successfully10 —
the displaced Irish would rebel, for they—remember all too well the measures necessary to 
9 Many scholars have wondered at the apparent discrepancy in Cyropaedia of presenting the “ideal” ruler, only 
to show the collapse of that ruler’s empire in the final chapter. James Tatum argues that Xenophon suffered 
from a divided mind. According to Tatum, the “gap between the political and historical world of the Cyropaedia 
finally outweighed [Xenophon’s] authorial desire to preserve the integrity of the text he created” (224). For a 
different view, see Christopher Nadon’s Xenophon’s Prince: Republic and Empire in the Cyropaedia. Nadon argues 
that Cyrus was far from Xenophon’s ideal ruler. Dante, Petrarch, and Boccacio [had] all referred to Cyrus as a 
“rapacious” king, and it was only in the fifteenth century that he began appearing “in a number of ‘mirrors of 
princes’ as an ideal ruler” (13). Nonetheless, Nadon agrees that Machiavelli read Xenophon from within the 
civic-humanist tradition and, therefore, as illegitimately idealizing a political figure. “Instead of recording what 
Cyrus must have done in order to succeed, Xenophon, in his naivety, imagined rather what he thought a good 
prince ought to do. He thereby misled Scipio as to the kind of duties imposed by the necessities faced by real 
generals and statesmen” (16). For Machiavelli had imagined that young Scipio had read the Cyropaedia cursorily, 
noticing only the fairy tale Cyrus on the surface of the text without seeing the treacherous, grasping, deceitful 
Cyrus at the core. Following Leo Strauss, Nadon believes that Xenophon wrote esoterically, containing a safe 
“surface” meaning and hidden yet dangerous “inner” meaning—a mode of writing that Machiavelli recognized 
and practiced himself. The civic-humanist tradition of a Philip Sidney, who praised teachers of virtue in 
general—and Xenophon over Plato specifically, because the former wrote poetry with philosophy in contrast to 
writing philosophy simply—is therefore subverted. In a way, my argument is that Spenser’s political science is a 
subversion of his poetry (and vice versa).
10 All the difference in the world exists between remembering intellectually the process of colonization, and 
remembering it psychologically.
moves onto a discussion concerning the idea that it is better (following Roman practice) 
to engage in war sooner rather than later. Machiavelli hereby shows his reluctance to make 
his points explicit. Yet given his statements about how easily hereditary princes maintain 
their princedoms (since the people have “forgotten” the measures taken to subjugate the 
principality originally), Irenius seems to have successfully grasped Machiavelli’s meaning 
when he advocates for extermination. Claims that colonies are worthwhile consequences 
with negligible consequences do not fool Irenius; those consequences urgently require 
handling.
A clearer example of Machiavelli’s ultimate goal may be gleamed from the following 
passage:
Because it would have been useless and dangerous for Pertinax and Alexander, 
being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was heir to the principality; and 
likewise it would have been utterly destructive to Caracalla, Commodus, and 
Maximinus to have imitated Severus, they not having sufficient valour to 
enable them to tread in his footsteps. (55)
The passage comes from the chapter, “That One Should Avoid Being Despised And Hated.” 
A great disparity lies between the two examples: Marcus Aurelius (the beloved emperor) 
and Septimus Severus (a brutal but successful one). Many princes with virtù have attempted 
to imitate either one or the other, but those who failed to successfully imitate Marcus 
did so because they were not the heirs of principalities—a truth recognized by Pertinax 
and Alexander, who therefore did not attempt to cultivate the same virtues cultivated by 
Marcus. Yet, Machiavelli continues, of those princes who failed to successfully imitate 
Severus, their failure was not due to some external circumstance (such as the misfortune 
not to inherit a principality), but to a failure of personal virtù. In other words, a prince may 
fail to imitate Marcus Aurelius if he lacks either virtù or an inherited kingdom, but princes 
who fail to imitate Severus fail only through lacking virtù. In a prince, morality is a luxury, 
nothing more—neither necessary nor even desirable. Princely morality is superfluous. As 
such, Machiavelli has no special theoretical space for it within a truly modern political 
philosophy.
The superfluity of morality in politics leads us, slowly, into Machiavelli’s reading of 
Xenophon. In the Renaissance, Xenophon enjoyed a high reputation, more so than now, and 
Machiavelli discusses him more often than he does Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero combined. 
According to W.R. Newell, Xenophon was the closest of all the ancient political thinkers to 
the Italian political philosopher; Xenophon alone of ancient thinkers “allowed the ambition 
for limitless rule to unfold in all its grandeur” (121). Whereas Plato and Aristotle sought 
to limit the desire for acquisitiveness, Xenophon took it seriously as a political principle. 
Yet where Machiavelli disagreed with Xenophon was in Xenophon’s failure to emancipate 
himself completely from the distinction between illegitimate and legitimate, tyrant and 
king, base and noble, vice and virtue. Often taken as the portrait of the ideal prince, 
Xenophon’s Cyropaedia contains some ambivalence towards the Persian monarch: “This 
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mixture of admiration for Cyrus and reservations about him makes Xenophon unwilling to 
depict Cyrus either as an out-and-out tyrant or as morally flawless” (126). 9
Although Machiavelli approves of Xenophon’s approbation of ambition, he must also 
distinguish between a textual Cyrus and a real Cyrus—viz., the actual prince versus the 
literary prince created by Xenophon. Whereas Achilles, Alexander, and Caesar had all 
imitated forebears, Scipio along had imitated not a forebear but the textual Cyrus:
And whoever reads the life of Cyrus, written by Xenophon, will recognize 
afterwards in the life of Scipio how that imitation was his glory, and how in 
chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality Scipio conformed to those things 
which have been written of Cyrus by Xenophon. (Machiavelli 66)
And it was commonly accepted that Scipio did greatly admire Xenophon. Cicero described 
the education of Cyrus as a “model of the just empire” and the constant guide of Scipio 
(Newell 110). But the problem is that those qualities described by Xenophon are not 
the sorts of qualities that enable one to acquire new princedoms, as Machiavelli well 
understood. Scipio’s career in the province of Spain was not successful until he adopted 
more “brutal” practices. We see such disjunction between political literature and political 
reality repeatedly in Machiavelli. Marcus Aurelius succeeded only because he inherited 
his kingdom; King Louis IX lost his kingdoms in Italy because he “kept faith” with the 
foreign powers he invited to share power there. And, as Spenser’s Irenius no doubt realizes, 
having deprived native Irish of their estates in order to plant English colonies, the noblest 
virtues of a prince—chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality—cannot be practiced safely. 
Unlike the English themselves—a people, once conquered by the Romans, who have 
forgotten the concrete measures taken by the Romans to subjugate them successfully10 —
the displaced Irish would rebel, for they—remember all too well the measures necessary to 
9 Many scholars have wondered at the apparent discrepancy in Cyropaedia of presenting the “ideal” ruler, only 
to show the collapse of that ruler’s empire in the final chapter. James Tatum argues that Xenophon suffered 
from a divided mind. According to Tatum, the “gap between the political and historical world of the Cyropaedia 
finally outweighed [Xenophon’s] authorial desire to preserve the integrity of the text he created” (224). For a 
different view, see Christopher Nadon’s Xenophon’s Prince: Republic and Empire in the Cyropaedia. Nadon argues 
that Cyrus was far from Xenophon’s ideal ruler. Dante, Petrarch, and Boccacio [had] all referred to Cyrus as a 
“rapacious” king, and it was only in the fifteenth century that he began appearing “in a number of ‘mirrors of 
princes’ as an ideal ruler” (13). Nonetheless, Nadon agrees that Machiavelli read Xenophon from within the 
civic-humanist tradition and, therefore, as illegitimately idealizing a political figure. “Instead of recording what 
Cyrus must have done in order to succeed, Xenophon, in his naivety, imagined rather what he thought a good 
prince ought to do. He thereby misled Scipio as to the kind of duties imposed by the necessities faced by real 
generals and statesmen” (16). For Machiavelli had imagined that young Scipio had read the Cyropaedia cursorily, 
noticing only the fairy tale Cyrus on the surface of the text without seeing the treacherous, grasping, deceitful 
Cyrus at the core. Following Leo Strauss, Nadon believes that Xenophon wrote esoterically, containing a safe 
“surface” meaning and hidden yet dangerous “inner” meaning—a mode of writing that Machiavelli recognized 
and practiced himself. The civic-humanist tradition of a Philip Sidney, who praised teachers of virtue in 
general—and Xenophon over Plato specifically, because the former wrote poetry with philosophy in contrast to 
writing philosophy simply—is therefore subverted. In a way, my argument is that Spenser’s political science is a 
subversion of his poetry (and vice versa).
10 All the difference in the world exists between remembering intellectually the process of colonization, and 
remembering it psychologically.
moves onto a discussion concerning the idea that it is better (following Roman practice) 
to engage in war sooner rather than later. Machiavelli hereby shows his reluctance to make 
his points explicit. Yet given his statements about how easily hereditary princes maintain 
their princedoms (since the people have “forgotten” the measures taken to subjugate the 
principality originally), Irenius seems to have successfully grasped Machiavelli’s meaning 
when he advocates for extermination. Claims that colonies are worthwhile consequences 
with negligible consequences do not fool Irenius; those consequences urgently require 
handling.
A clearer example of Machiavelli’s ultimate goal may be gleamed from the following 
passage:
Because it would have been useless and dangerous for Pertinax and Alexander, 
being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was heir to the principality; and 
likewise it would have been utterly destructive to Caracalla, Commodus, and 
Maximinus to have imitated Severus, they not having sufficient valour to 
enable them to tread in his footsteps. (55)
The passage comes from the chapter, “That One Should Avoid Being Despised And Hated.” 
A great disparity lies between the two examples: Marcus Aurelius (the beloved emperor) 
and Septimus Severus (a brutal but successful one). Many princes with virtù have attempted 
to imitate either one or the other, but those who failed to successfully imitate Marcus 
did so because they were not the heirs of principalities—a truth recognized by Pertinax 
and Alexander, who therefore did not attempt to cultivate the same virtues cultivated by 
Marcus. Yet, Machiavelli continues, of those princes who failed to successfully imitate 
Severus, their failure was not due to some external circumstance (such as the misfortune 
not to inherit a principality), but to a failure of personal virtù. In other words, a prince may 
fail to imitate Marcus Aurelius if he lacks either virtù or an inherited kingdom, but princes 
who fail to imitate Severus fail only through lacking virtù. In a prince, morality is a luxury, 
nothing more—neither necessary nor even desirable. Princely morality is superfluous. As 
such, Machiavelli has no special theoretical space for it within a truly modern political 
philosophy.
The superfluity of morality in politics leads us, slowly, into Machiavelli’s reading of 
Xenophon. In the Renaissance, Xenophon enjoyed a high reputation, more so than now, and 
Machiavelli discusses him more often than he does Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero combined. 
According to W.R. Newell, Xenophon was the closest of all the ancient political thinkers to 
the Italian political philosopher; Xenophon alone of ancient thinkers “allowed the ambition 
for limitless rule to unfold in all its grandeur” (121). Whereas Plato and Aristotle sought 
to limit the desire for acquisitiveness, Xenophon took it seriously as a political principle. 
Yet where Machiavelli disagreed with Xenophon was in Xenophon’s failure to emancipate 
himself completely from the distinction between illegitimate and legitimate, tyrant and 
king, base and noble, vice and virtue. Often taken as the portrait of the ideal prince, 
Xenophon’s Cyropaedia contains some ambivalence towards the Persian monarch: “This 
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onto an old princedom a new princedom differing in laws and customs, adopts the modern 
attitude that his artistry cannot theoretically accept. 
Conclusion
According to Leo Strauss, Machiavelli’s great innovation in political philosophy is 
that Machiavelli—the paramount “teacher of evil” (9)—had proclaimed “openly and 
triumphantly a corrupting doctrine that ancient writers had taught covertly or with all 
signs of repugnance” (10).13  We have seen how Machiavelli can be deliberately coy with 
his doctrines, deliberately contradicting himself in certain places, avoiding stating his true 
meaning explicitly in others, and generally talking around certain issues that he simply 
expects his readers to intuit. What Spenser does in A View is proclaim a Machiavellian 
teaching with an openness that even the famed Italian hesitated to use. A View is remarkably 
straight-forward in its policies of extermination, famine, cultural destruction, and forced 
relocation. Rather than writing esoterically, Spenser ameliorates the shockingness of 
his proposals via the dialogue form, a rhetorical device situating those views within the 
humanist tradition. It is intriguing to note that Spenser mentions Machiavelli only once, 
at the very end of his text—and the reference is not to The Prince but to Discourses on Livy, 
Machiavelli’s republican tract. So, whereas Machiavelli chooses to couch his true teaching 
in misdirection and innuendo, Spenser proclaims that teaching openly—but attempts to 
soften its horror under more “liberal” auspices. Spenser’s reputation as a moral poet, we 
might also suppose, perhaps partially insulated him against the same contemporary English 
opprobrium applied to Machiavelli himself, whom they believed to be an atheist and the 
worst kind of cynic.
Ultimately, I have argued for a fundamental split in how we should read Spenser. 
His poetry harkens back to classical moral writing, brought to Spenser by his admiration 
for Sir Philip Sidney; however, his political science shows a divisive break with ancient 
political philosophy. The incompatibility of the two positions shows the influence of two 
entirely different traditions of thought (ancient and modern) and two entirely different 
genres of writing (poetry and political science). Perhaps my particular position does not 
absolve Spenser from blame, although that is not really my intent. My greatest worry is 
that a modern moral framework might blind our judgment to methods of valuing and 
interpreting that have since become obscured by the centuries—Spenser’s insight into 
Machiavelli’s esoteric writing may seem implausible today, but only because esoteric writing 
has ceased to be necessary within modern liberal democracy. Now, on whether Spenser’s 
humanist-realpolitik or Machiavelli esoteric-realpolitik is the more invidious or subversive 
method, that I leave up to the individual reader. Needless to say, for an age steeped in 
universal human rights, an age that too well remembers the Holocaust and decolonization, 
neither method is entirely palatable. But that is a modern perspective. Even if we lament 
Spenser as a poet of the state, as Yeats does, we should also acknowledge that he possessed 
13 For example, see Plato’s treatment of Thrasymachus and Callicles, or Thucydide’s dialogue between the 
Melians and the Athenian envoys.
evict them from their ancestral lands. This is the essential point about Machiavelli’s reading 
of Xenophon. As Newell says, Scipio (initially) followed the textual Cyrus, but a ruler such 
as Hannibal followed the real Cyrus—who, like Hannibal, had to rule a wide variety of 
peoples with different languages and different customs. (Newell notes that Machiavelli’s 
interpretation of Xenophon’s Cyrus is possibly polemically sugar-coated, since Xenophon 
does portray his Cyrus as inspiring fear.)11 
Machiavelli’s understanding of Xenophon offers, I believe, a way to grasp the seeming 
disparity between Spenser’s art and Spenser’s political science. Spenser’s art owed a great 
debt to classical models, however so much he revised and expanded them. Not only does 
Spenser attempt to portray the “twelue priuate morall virtues” in the ideal realm of Faerie, 
but he—like Xenophon—cannot completely emancipate his art from distinctions between 
the noble and the base or between vice and virtue. Even Book V of the Faerie Queene, which 
defends Lord Grey in the figure of Artegall, remains beholden to the distinctions between 
tyranny and legitimate rule, right and wrong, and justice and injustice that belong to classical 
political philosophy. Grantorto, for example, is explicitly called “tyrant” (v.xii.25). Artegall 
himself studied “true Iustice how to deale / And day and night employ’d his busie paine” 
(v.xii.26). True justice. The word “justice” does not occur anywhere in The Prince, however. 
Justice—true or otherwise—has no place within Machiavelli’s political philosophy, nor 
does the term “tyrant.” It is precisely this same sort of “emancipation” from classical political 
philosophy that finds its way into A View, however. By my count, excluding titles like “Justice 
of the Peace,” the concept of justice or injustice appears as an abstract general concept acting 
as a foundational legal principle only four times in the text.12 (The words “just” and “unjust” 
appear more frequently, but only as individual attributes or deeds.) Every instance is spoken 
by Irenius—not the moral and trustworthy Eudoxus, significantly. By the latter half of the 
book, though, all instances of “justice” and even most of the instances for “just” disappear. . 
. except in relation to Lord Grey, whom Spenser (and Irenius?) have a stake in defending. 
(Incidentally, the defense of Lord Grey is where Eudoxus’s own references to justness grow 
most forceful and frequent.) “Tyranny” or “tyrant” appears absolutely nowhere in A View. 
So it seems safe to say that Spenser, in contrast to his art, felt comfortable in phasing out 
an important concept like justice from his political tract, except where it might polemically 
serve Irenius’s needs. Spenser, seeing the practical problems of colonial rule, of annexing 
11 When “Machiavelli wants to emphasize the need to use fraud, he buttresses his argument with Xenophon’s 
version of Cyrus. When he wants to emphasize the need to use force, however, he ignores Xenophon’s version 
in favor of his own. The implication is that while Xenophon teaches well enough the need for fraud, he does not 
make his readers sufficiently aware of the need to use force” (124-25).
12 The first two instances are the most significant, and they both occur relatively early in the text: “laws ought 
to be fashioned unto the manners and conditions of the people” so as to not “pervert iustice to extreame iustice” 
(20); “true iustice punisheth nothing but the evill act or wicked word” (30). These two cases are the only places 
where Irenius comes close to formulating a theoretical concept of justice. The next two instances of the term 
are less global in scope. First, in the scoffing words of Irenius, the Irish “complaine hee hath no iustice” due to 
the partiality of non-Irish magistrates (31), and the last reference is a politically charged for Irenius, critiquing 
Thomas Butler, eleventh Earl of Ormond, against whom Spenser may have had a grudge for his role in having 
Lord Grey recalled in 1582 (37). The term justice appears nowhere in the following three-fourths of the text.
Classical Poetry and Modern Political Philosophy: Spenser and Machiavelli in A View of the State of Ireland
Middle Tennessee State University 1514 Spring 2014
Scientia et Humanitas: A Journal of Student Research
onto an old princedom a new princedom differing in laws and customs, adopts the modern 
attitude that his artistry cannot theoretically accept. 
Conclusion
According to Leo Strauss, Machiavelli’s great innovation in political philosophy is 
that Machiavelli—the paramount “teacher of evil” (9)—had proclaimed “openly and 
triumphantly a corrupting doctrine that ancient writers had taught covertly or with all 
signs of repugnance” (10).13  We have seen how Machiavelli can be deliberately coy with 
his doctrines, deliberately contradicting himself in certain places, avoiding stating his true 
meaning explicitly in others, and generally talking around certain issues that he simply 
expects his readers to intuit. What Spenser does in A View is proclaim a Machiavellian 
teaching with an openness that even the famed Italian hesitated to use. A View is remarkably 
straight-forward in its policies of extermination, famine, cultural destruction, and forced 
relocation. Rather than writing esoterically, Spenser ameliorates the shockingness of 
his proposals via the dialogue form, a rhetorical device situating those views within the 
humanist tradition. It is intriguing to note that Spenser mentions Machiavelli only once, 
at the very end of his text—and the reference is not to The Prince but to Discourses on Livy, 
Machiavelli’s republican tract. So, whereas Machiavelli chooses to couch his true teaching 
in misdirection and innuendo, Spenser proclaims that teaching openly—but attempts to 
soften its horror under more “liberal” auspices. Spenser’s reputation as a moral poet, we 
might also suppose, perhaps partially insulated him against the same contemporary English 
opprobrium applied to Machiavelli himself, whom they believed to be an atheist and the 
worst kind of cynic.
Ultimately, I have argued for a fundamental split in how we should read Spenser. 
His poetry harkens back to classical moral writing, brought to Spenser by his admiration 
for Sir Philip Sidney; however, his political science shows a divisive break with ancient 
political philosophy. The incompatibility of the two positions shows the influence of two 
entirely different traditions of thought (ancient and modern) and two entirely different 
genres of writing (poetry and political science). Perhaps my particular position does not 
absolve Spenser from blame, although that is not really my intent. My greatest worry is 
that a modern moral framework might blind our judgment to methods of valuing and 
interpreting that have since become obscured by the centuries—Spenser’s insight into 
Machiavelli’s esoteric writing may seem implausible today, but only because esoteric writing 
has ceased to be necessary within modern liberal democracy. Now, on whether Spenser’s 
humanist-realpolitik or Machiavelli esoteric-realpolitik is the more invidious or subversive 
method, that I leave up to the individual reader. Needless to say, for an age steeped in 
universal human rights, an age that too well remembers the Holocaust and decolonization, 
neither method is entirely palatable. But that is a modern perspective. Even if we lament 
Spenser as a poet of the state, as Yeats does, we should also acknowledge that he possessed 
13 For example, see Plato’s treatment of Thrasymachus and Callicles, or Thucydide’s dialogue between the 
Melians and the Athenian envoys.
evict them from their ancestral lands. This is the essential point about Machiavelli’s reading 
of Xenophon. As Newell says, Scipio (initially) followed the textual Cyrus, but a ruler such 
as Hannibal followed the real Cyrus—who, like Hannibal, had to rule a wide variety of 
peoples with different languages and different customs. (Newell notes that Machiavelli’s 
interpretation of Xenophon’s Cyrus is possibly polemically sugar-coated, since Xenophon 
does portray his Cyrus as inspiring fear.)11 
Machiavelli’s understanding of Xenophon offers, I believe, a way to grasp the seeming 
disparity between Spenser’s art and Spenser’s political science. Spenser’s art owed a great 
debt to classical models, however so much he revised and expanded them. Not only does 
Spenser attempt to portray the “twelue priuate morall virtues” in the ideal realm of Faerie, 
but he—like Xenophon—cannot completely emancipate his art from distinctions between 
the noble and the base or between vice and virtue. Even Book V of the Faerie Queene, which 
defends Lord Grey in the figure of Artegall, remains beholden to the distinctions between 
tyranny and legitimate rule, right and wrong, and justice and injustice that belong to classical 
political philosophy. Grantorto, for example, is explicitly called “tyrant” (v.xii.25). Artegall 
himself studied “true Iustice how to deale / And day and night employ’d his busie paine” 
(v.xii.26). True justice. The word “justice” does not occur anywhere in The Prince, however. 
Justice—true or otherwise—has no place within Machiavelli’s political philosophy, nor 
does the term “tyrant.” It is precisely this same sort of “emancipation” from classical political 
philosophy that finds its way into A View, however. By my count, excluding titles like “Justice 
of the Peace,” the concept of justice or injustice appears as an abstract general concept acting 
as a foundational legal principle only four times in the text.12 (The words “just” and “unjust” 
appear more frequently, but only as individual attributes or deeds.) Every instance is spoken 
by Irenius—not the moral and trustworthy Eudoxus, significantly. By the latter half of the 
book, though, all instances of “justice” and even most of the instances for “just” disappear. . 
. except in relation to Lord Grey, whom Spenser (and Irenius?) have a stake in defending. 
(Incidentally, the defense of Lord Grey is where Eudoxus’s own references to justness grow 
most forceful and frequent.) “Tyranny” or “tyrant” appears absolutely nowhere in A View. 
So it seems safe to say that Spenser, in contrast to his art, felt comfortable in phasing out 
an important concept like justice from his political tract, except where it might polemically 
serve Irenius’s needs. Spenser, seeing the practical problems of colonial rule, of annexing 
11 When “Machiavelli wants to emphasize the need to use fraud, he buttresses his argument with Xenophon’s 
version of Cyrus. When he wants to emphasize the need to use force, however, he ignores Xenophon’s version 
in favor of his own. The implication is that while Xenophon teaches well enough the need for fraud, he does not 
make his readers sufficiently aware of the need to use force” (124-25).
12 The first two instances are the most significant, and they both occur relatively early in the text: “laws ought 
to be fashioned unto the manners and conditions of the people” so as to not “pervert iustice to extreame iustice” 
(20); “true iustice punisheth nothing but the evill act or wicked word” (30). These two cases are the only places 
where Irenius comes close to formulating a theoretical concept of justice. The next two instances of the term 
are less global in scope. First, in the scoffing words of Irenius, the Irish “complaine hee hath no iustice” due to 
the partiality of non-Irish magistrates (31), and the last reference is a politically charged for Irenius, critiquing 
Thomas Butler, eleventh Earl of Ormond, against whom Spenser may have had a grudge for his role in having 
Lord Grey recalled in 1582 (37). The term justice appears nowhere in the following three-fourths of the text.
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enough freedom of mind and intellectual acumen not to mix his poetry with his politics. 
Perhaps the best that can be said for now is that we should agree with Nicholas Canny’s 
assessment that A View ranks as “a social and political statement of the first importance” 
(“Spenser” 203). 
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Abstract
In this study fecal egg counts were performed on horses in six barns in Middle Tennessee 
to assess parasite load and the effectiveness of deworming programs. Samples were collected 
and tested before and after deworming and results found through the McMaster technique 
were compared with currently practiced deworming programs. Results showed the presence of 
parasites in all barns, though parasite load varied with a number of factors such as consistency 
of treatment, deworming frequency, and products used.  All deworming products were found 
to be effective.  This research provides insight to a more informed alternative deworming 
protocol, based on actual parasite load, than is typically used throughout the horse industry 
today.   Future studies are suggested to compare the effectiveness of rotating products vs. use of 
a single product, and evaluating parasite load of stallions vs. mares or geldings.
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